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ABSTRACT 
We evaluate whether government intervention through the subsidization of business angel 
networks enhances regional economic growth. We show that, firstly, BANs reduce the 
information and financing problems entrepreneurial companies face. Secondly, these 
companies contribute to economic development and growth. Thirdly, there are positive 
indicators of future potential, such as an upward evolution in value creation and ability to 
raise follow-on financing. Finally, the programme has many positive indirect effects. This 
leads us to tentatively conclude that public BAN support is warranted. However, to make this 
conclusion more robust requires a longer-term evaluation. 
 
JEL Codes: G24, H71, M13, R58 
 
Keywords: risk capital, business angels, policy, economic development, market failure 
 
Une évaluation des finances publiques en faveur des réseaux de bailleurs de fonds en 
Flandres. 
 
 
Collewaert et al. 
 
 
On cherche à évaluer si, oui ou non, l’intervention du gouvernement par moyen des 
subventions en faveur des réseaux de bailleurs de fonds augmente la croissance économique 
régionale. On montre que, primo, les réseaux de bailleurs de fonds (BANs; Business Angel 
Networks) atténuent les problèmes que doivent affronter les entreprises entrepreneuriales dans 
les domaines de l’information et des finances. Secundo, ces entreprises contribuent au 
développement et à la croisssance économiques. Tertio, il y a des clignotants positifs quant au 
potentiel futur, tels un mouvement vers le haut de la création de valeur et la capacité à trouver 
des finances complémentaires. Pour finir, le programme a beaucoup d’effets indirects positifs. 
Cela amène à conclure provisoirement que les finances publiques en faveur des BANs sont 
justifiées. Cependant, il faut une évaluation à plus long terme pour affirmer cette conclusion. 
 
 
Capital-risque / Bailleurs de fonds / Politique / Développement économique / Distorsion du 
marché 
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Classement JEL: G24; H71; M13; R58 
 
Eine Bewertung der staatlichen Finanzierung von Business-Angel-
Netzwerken in Flandern 
VERONIEK COLLEWAERT, SOPHIE MANIGART and RUDY AERNOUDT 
 
ABSTRACT 
Wir untersuchen, ob sich durch eine staatliche Intervention in Form einer 
Subventionierung von Business-Angel-Netzwerken das regionale 
Wirtschaftswachstum verbessert. Gezeigt wird erstens, dass Business-Angel-
Netzwerke die Informations- und Finanzierungsprobleme junger Firmen reduzieren. 
Zweitens tragen diese Firmen zur Wirtschaftsentwicklung und zum 
Wirtschaftswachstum bei. Drittens liegen positive Indikatoren für das 
Zukunftspotenzial vor, wie z. B. hinsichtlich einer Aufwärtsevolution bei der 
Wertschaffung und der Fähigkeit zur Sicherung von Nachfolgefinanzierung. 
Schließlich hat das Programm zahlreiche positive indirekte Auswirkungen. Diese 
Ergebnisse veranlassen uns zur vorsichtigen Schlussfolgerung, dass eine öffentliche 
Unterstützung von Business-Angel-Netzwerken empfehlenswert ist. Allerdings ist 
eine längerfristige Bewertung erforderlich, um dieses Fazit robuster zu gestalten. 
 
JEL Codes: G24, H71, M13, R58 
 
Keywords:  
Risikokapital 
Business Angels 
Politik 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung 
Scheitern auf dem Markt 
 
Valoración de la financiación estatal de las redes de inversión privada en Flandes 
 
Veroniek Collewaert, Sophie Manigart  And Rudy Aernoudt 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Aquí evaluamos si mediante una intervención estatal en forma de subsidio de las 
business angel networks (BAN) o redes de inversión privada es posible aumentar el 
crecimiento económico regional. En primer lugar, mostramos que las BAN reducen 
los problemas de información y financiamiento de las sociedades empresariales. En 
segundo lugar, estas sociedades contribuyen al desarrollo y crecimiento 
económicos. En tercer lugar, existen indicadores positivos del potencial futuro, por 
ejemplo una evolución ascendente en la creación de valores y la habilidad para 
procurar una financiación de seguimiento. Por último, el programa tiene muchos 
efectos positivos indirectos. Esto nos lleva a concluir provisionalmente que es 
recomendable un apoyo público de las BAN. Sin embargo, para que esta conclusión 
sea más sólida es necesaria una evaluación a largo plazo. 
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Capital de riesgo 
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Desarrollo económico 
Fallo mercantil 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
     Over the past decade, governments from all over the world have launched initiatives to 
stimulate risk capital markets (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003b; MAULA et al., 2007). 
Risk capital refers to external equity financing of entrepreneurial companies and encompasses 
both formal venture capital (VC) and informal risk capital, also known as business angel (BA) 
financing (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001). Formal VC is provided by institutional, 
professional investors, while BA financing is provided by private investors with no family or 
friend connections to their investees (HARRISON and MASON, 1999; EVCA, 2002). Sohl 
(2005) estimates that 227,000 U.S. BAs invested $23.1 billion in 49,500 companies in 2005, 
compared to VC investors investing $21.7 billion in only 2,939 companies 
(PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS et al., 2006).  There is a relative scarcity of statistics on 
European BA investments. Mason (2006) estimates that 20,000 to 40,000 U.K. angels yearly 
invest £0.5 billion to £1 billion in 3,000 to 6,000 companies, backing eight times more start-
ups than VC investors.   
 
     While a small number of growth-oriented start-ups contribute disproportionately to 
innovation, economic growth and job creation (e.g. WONG et al., 2005; FRITSCH and 
FALCK, 2007), policy makers believe that there is a market failure in that many 
entrepreneurial companies are prevented from exploiting growth opportunities due to a lack of 
risk capital (MASON and HARRISON, 2003; CARLSON and CHAKRABARTI, 2007). 
Hence they have established support programmes to stimulate risk capital financing and 
thereby foster economic growth (CUMMING, 2007). This perceived failure in risk capital 
markets is addressed either by directly increasing the supply of risk capital or by increasing 
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expected returns to investors through decreasing taxation, improving exit markets, or reducing 
barriers to entrepreneurship (DA RIN et al., 2006).  
 
     Risk capital has been shown to have a strong regional dimension, with risk capital 
investors often specializing in investing in a geographically concentrated region (CARLSON 
and CHAKRABARTI, 2007; CHRISTEN, 2007). Whereas the European Commission argues 
that VC activity needs to be regionally clustered in order to create necessary levels of 
specialization within high-tech clusters, the OECD and some EU member states have argued 
for a more even regional distribution (MARTIN et al., 2002). Following the latter view, 
government policies throughout Europe and the U.S. have often focused on ensuring an 
adequate regional supply of risk capital (e.g. VENKATARAMAN, 2004; CHRISTEN, 2007).  
      
     Various studies have assessed the impact of public policies aimed at stimulating formal 
VC markets (e.g. LERNER, 1999; 2002; AYAYI, 2004; DA RIN et al., 2006; CUMMING, 
2007). There is, however, a lack of insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of policies 
targeted towards BAs, such as tax reliefs, support of BA networks (BANs) or BA co-
investment funds (MAULA et al., 2007). In the current paper, we evaluate one type of 
government intervention programme to stimulate informal risk capital: the support of BANs. 
We focus on one Belgian region, Flanders, as this allows an in-depth assessment. We assess 
whether the programme is warranted by evaluating whether it is based on the right 
assumptions and has achieved its goals. 
 
     We proceed by providing theoretical rationales for government intervention in the informal 
risk capital market and describe how and why the Flemish government has supported BANs. 
Page 6 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
Thereafter, we discuss the research method used to evaluate the programme. In the results 
section, we evaluate its direct effects and briefly discuss its indirect effects.  
 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL MARKET 
 
     Government intervention in the informal risk capital market is based on a market failure 
argument, caused by R&D externalities and information problems (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2003b; MURRAY, 2007). R&D externalities refer to the fact that the value 
of R&D investments is not fully internalized, as they generate benefits for parties outside the 
company (LERNER, 1999). While investors would like to appropriate all returns generated by 
high-potential companies given their high perceived risks (DA RIN et al., 2006; MURRAY, 
2007), R&D externalities prevent this, leading investors to provide less financing than would 
be socially optimal (CUMMING, 2007; MURRAY, 2007). Small firms might be especially 
prone to this due to “their lesser market power and inability to finance the aggressive defence 
of intellectual ownership infringements” (MURRAY, 2007, p. 14).  
 
     A second source of market failure is the high level of information asymmetry in small and 
young companies, caused by a lack of track record and profit generation and resulting in high 
uncertainty for investors. Hence, these companies are constrained from access to public 
capital markets and bank financing (DA RIN et al., 2006). Moreover, R&D investments do 
not create collateralisable assets. As financing of low-collateral companies requires 
monitoring (HOLMSTROM and TIROLE, 1997), arm’s-length lenders constrain credit 
towards these companies (DA RIN et al., 2006). Therefore, they have to rely on BAs or VCs 
as they more actively monitor their investments (BERGER and UDELL, 1998).  
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     VCs and BAs mitigate information problems, which may result in adverse selection and 
moral hazard risks, through extensive due diligence pre-investment, writing extensive 
contracts at investment and monitoring post-investment (BERGER and UDELL, 1998). 
However, due to scale economies in these costly processes and in order to further reduce risk, 
VCs have shifted their focus toward larger and older investments (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2003a; MASON and HARRISON, 2003). Furthermore, VC investments tend 
to be geographically concentrated and focused on a few industries (LERNER, 2002; 
CARLSON and CHAKRABARTI, 2007; CHRISTEN, 2007). Hence, it is argued that small 
and young ventures, especially those active in regions or industries with little VC, have 
difficulties in raising sufficient capital even if they have great value-creating potential. 
Therefore they resort to BA funding, which therefore may be particularly important in regions 
where VC is lacking (MASON and HARRISON, 1995). 
 
     Another information problem is the lack of transparency in the informal risk capital 
market. Entrepreneurs are not always fully informed about the array of possible financing 
sources and their characteristics (VAN AUKEN, 2001). Even if they understand BA 
financing, they are not always able to locate BAs, as these often do not want to make their 
investment intentions public. In the same vein, BAs have trouble in locating valuable 
investment opportunities (MASON and HARRISON, 2002). These problems led to the 
creation of BANs, which provide an information channel between entrepreneurs and BAs 
without giving up the privacy of the latter (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b). 
 
     Conclusive evidence concerning the existence of a market failure is lacking (MAULA and 
MURRAY, 2003; JÄÄSKELÄINEN et al., 2006), as the lack of risk capital may be due more 
to the poor quality of the demand than to the unavailability of capital (MASON and 
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HARRISON, 2002; 2003). Venkataraman (2004) argues that risk capital is a necessary, but 
non-sufficient condition for fostering regional growth-oriented entrepreneurship. Intangible 
regional assets, such as access to novel ideas, role models or region-specific opportunities, are 
equally important. Merely injecting risk capital in a region may thus lead to promoting low-
quality entrepreneurship (VENKATARAMAN, 2004).The lack of financing per se is not 
enough to constitute a market failure; the financing constraint has to regard value-creating 
companies.  
 
REGIONAL APPROACH TO INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL: BUSINESS ANGEL 
NETWORKS 
 
     Increasingly, governments take a regional approach to reduce the perceived risk capital 
market failure (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006): policy is implemented at the lowest 
level possible, on the condition that it is still efficient (SUNLEY et al., 2005). In addition to 
addressing specific regional market conditions, regional risk capital programmes are also 
warranted as geographic proximity is important in the early-stage investor-investee 
relationship (SUNLEY et al., 2005; CARLSON and CHAKRABARTI, 2007). For an 
investment to take place, face-to-face contact between investor and investee is required to 
reduce information asymmetries and create trust (EBAN, 1998; AERNOUDT, 1999). 
Proximity further facilitates active coaching and advising, allowing companies to benefit 
more from the investor’s network and effort (MASON and HARRISON, 1995; SUNLEY et 
al., 2005).  
 
     One regional measure aimed at facilitating early-stage funding is the public funding and 
support of BANs. Based on an evaluation of the potential of establishing regional BANs in 
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Europe and the positive results of a pioneer programme in the U.K., the Commission 
stimulated, facilitated and financed the establishment of BANs in the late nineties (EBAN, 
1998; HARRISON and MASON, 1999). Other measures that stimulate the informal risk 
capital market, such as tax incentives, improved legislation, education of BAs and 
entrepreneurs or co-investment schemes, cannot work effectively without first reducing search 
problems (MASON, 2006).  
 
     Europe counted 231 BANs in 2005, of which 68% were publicly funded (EBAN, 
2005a;b). It was initially assumed that public subsidies were needed to launch BANs, but that 
these could become self-supporting after five years thanks to revenues from membership fees, 
success fees or sponsoring (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a; VAN ROMPUY, 1999). This 
assumption is, however, not confirmed (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a). Governments are 
now confronted with the question whether subsidies have to cease as initially foreseen - which 
would result in most BANs closing down - or whether long-lasting structural subsidies are 
justified to maintain the BANs. A critical evaluation of BAN support is hence timely. The 
success of BANs has been both widely endorsed and strongly contended, but there is no 
agreement on their effectiveness (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a;b; MASON and 
HARRISON, 2002). Harrison and Mason (1996a;b) provided the only BAN evaluation study 
to our knowledge and so represents our only benchmark. In order to advance their work and 
make a thorough evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of public BAN support, we concentrate 
on one region in Belgium, Flanders, from 1999 to 2004.  
 
     The first Belgian BAN, Vlerick BAN, was subsidised by the Flemish government in 1999. 
Three other BANs were subsequently founded and subsidized. Together, they were the only 
BANs operating in Flanders until 2004 (after which they all merged) and all operated in the 
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same way, through investor forums. These forums are events where entrepreneurs can pitch 
their ideas face-to-face to BAN members and discuss them in more depth with potentially 
interested BAs (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003a). The Flemish government, following 
the European Commission’s rationales, considered the BANs as a way to reduce the financing 
problems entrepreneurial companies face, through reducing information problems (VAN 
ROMPUY, 1999). The financing of the networks was considered as one way to promote 
entrepreneurship and innovation in Flanders (VAN ROMPUY, 1999). 
  
     Together, these four BANs represented 140 BAs1 and 58 deals in 55 companies, in which 
54 BAs invested between 1999 and 2004. The total amount of subsidies granted to the four 
BANs between 1999 and 2004 was €856,741, representing 50% of their operating costs. The 
subsidy per deal was €14,800 or 21% lower than the €18,900 per deal for the British 
Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) informal investment demonstration projects 
(HARRISON and MASON, 1996b).  
 
     Evaluating public funding of BANs within one region has advantages. The four BANs all 
operate within the same economic, legislative and fiscal environment, increasing the internal 
validity of the evaluation. The external validity of the study is nevertheless warranted based 
on following arguments. First, Belgian socio-economic indicators as income distribution, 
employment rate, social security fees and trade balance are similar to indicators in other 
European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Spain and Italy 
(STROOBANDT et al., 2005). Second, the Flemish BANs are similar to BANs in comparable 
European countries. A Flemish BAN closed, on average, 4.5 deals in 2003, compared to 0.2, 
4.7 and 6 deals per BAN in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, respectively. A Flemish BAN 
counted, on average, 35 BA members compared to 26 members in Germany, 35 in Italy and 
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45 in Spain (EBAN, 2005a). The informal risk capital market is less mature in Continental 
Europe than in the U.S. and U.K. (EBAN, 2005a). For example, the U.K. counted 34 BANs in 
2004, a number similar to the U.S., with an average of 5 deals per BAN (EBAN, 2005b). 
Third, the fiscal treatment of BA investments is comparable to that in other countries, except 
that capital gains realised by private individuals are not taxed. Finally, Flanders is a region 
with 5 million inhabitants and thus fits into the criteria suggested for establishing a BAN 
(EBAN, 1998). Hence, its evaluation can present relevant conclusions for other European 
regions.  
 
HOW TO EVALUATE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES? 
 
     According to Lerner and colleagues, the “starting point for any evaluation of a government 
programme is the goals it was designed to achieve” (LERNER et al., 2005, p. 140), which is 
what most evaluation studies do (e.g. BOYNS et al., 2005; MAULA and MURRAY, 2003; 
AYAYI, 2004; LERNER et al., 2005; CUMMING, 2007). Through BAN subsidies, the 
Flemish government’s goal was to stimulate regional entrepreneurship, innovation and job 
creation by reducing the perceived information and financing problems (sub-goals) 
entrepreneurial companies face (VAN ROMPUY, 1999). The BANs’ mission was to create a 
market where entrepreneurs looking for finance and BAs looking for investments could find 
each other. In addition, one needs to assess the assumptions the initiative and its objectives 
are based upon (MAULA and MURRAY, 2003). The assumption the Flemish government 
and the European Commission made when subsidising BANs was that there was a market 
failure, namely that some value-creating entrepreneurial companies suffered from financing 
problems. Finally, in order to assess the full impact of a government programme, one needs to 
go beyond its direct effects (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b; LERNER, 1999). Positive 
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indirect effects of the BAN subsidies may include the enhancement of overall awareness for 
BA financing or entrepreneurs’ and investors’ education.  
 
     Therefore, in order to evaluate government funding of BANs, we need to answer following 
questions: 
1. Is there a failure in the informal risk capital market?  
a. Did the companies financed through BANs suffer from information problems 
and resulting financing constraints? 
b. Were these companies value-creating? 
2. Do BANs reduce the financing problems of entrepreneurial companies?  
3. Do these companies contribute to regional economic development?  
4. What are the indirect effects of the BAN subsidies? 
  
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
     Researchers have generally used either one of two approaches to study the foregoing 
questions. Some relied on qualitative data by gathering general information on the 
government measures taken and/or by interviewing beneficiaries or experts (e.g. MURRAY, 
1998; DOSSANI and KENNEY, 2002; MAULA and MURRAY, 2003). Others compared the 
performance of beneficiaries to that of comparable non-beneficiaries using a quantitative 
approach (e.g. LERNER, 1999; AYAYI, 2004; CUMMING, 2007). A contribution of our 
study is that we combine both approaches, leading to a richer understanding and rigorous 
analysis of the research questions. 
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     We first solicited interviews from the beneficiaries, being all 55 entrepreneurs and 54 BAs 
who were involved in a deal through one of the four Flemish BANs. This resulted in 28 
interviews with entrepreneurs (including three of which managed failed companies) and 34 
interviews with BAs. The interviews give insight into how market participants, i.e. 
entrepreneurs and investors, perceive market failure in terms of information and financing 
problems and in the contribution of BANs in reducing this failure.  
 
     As interviews provide subjective views, we complement them with hard data, namely the 
financial accounts of all companies that received BA financing through one of the BANs 
(BAN-backed companies). We compare their debt capacity prior to BA investment to that of a 
matched benchmark group of non-BA-backed companies. In order for a market failure to 
exist, BAN-backed companies should have depleted their debt capacity prior to BA 
investment. If not, they should be able to access traditional debt financing sources. A firm has 
depleted its debt capacity if its financial risk, measured as the ratio of the book value of debt 
to total assets, is high or if it does not have the capacity to service the fixed interest and 
principal repayments attached to debt, measured by its internally generated cash flows 
(LEMMON and ZENDER, 2004). We add profitability measures such as return on assets, 
pre-tax profit and operational profit as further indicators of a firm’s risk (e.g. ALTMAN, 
1968). 
 
     A second pre-investment comparison relates to companies that did not resort to a BAN but 
nevertheless received BA financing. This is relevant as one might argue that, in an efficient 
risk capital market, entrepreneurs with value-creating projects should be able to raise BA 
financing even without a BAN. First, having a poor personal network might be an indication 
of the inability of the entrepreneur to network with third parties that are relevant for 
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conducting business, hence increasing the odds that the entrepreneur will not be able to 
develop the venture satisfactorily. Second, parties within an entrepreneur’s network face 
lower information asymmetries, as they are able to better assess potential agency problems. 
Failure to find a personally known investor might be an indication of excessive agency risk. 
Hence, entrepreneurs with a high ability and low agency risk should be able to find a BA 
without a BAN. If the above reasoning holds, we expect BAN-backed companies to be more 
risky than companies that found BA financing through another channel. If, however, the risk 
of both groups is the same, then this is additional evidence of market inefficiencies.  
 
     Further, in order for a market failure to exist, companies facing financing constraints 
should have value-creating projects. In order to assess how “effectively and profitably” 
(MURRAY, 2007, p. 8) the BAN-backed companies employ their financing, we measure their 
return on assets (ROA) from the year of BA participation up to four years thereafter. Ideally, 
we should compare ROA to the companies’ funding cost to assess value creation. As it is 
difficult to estimate the funding cost of unquoted companies, we compare the ROA of BAN-
backed companies to both that of non-BA-backed companies and companies that found BA 
financing through another channel. Hence, we assume that these companies have a 
comparable funding cost2. Additionally, we conduct the same analyses on value added - a 
proxy for sales – (rescaled by total assets) as a robustness check. Value-added is the 
difference between operating income and the value of inputs.  
 
     In order to assess whether BAN-backed companies contribute to economic development, 
we studied the absolute amount and growth in employment and value-added (LERNER, 1999; 
EVCA, 2002) and the federal taxes paid by the BAN-backed companies (EVCA, 2002). 
Growth is calculated as the average yearly growth from the year of BA investment to the last 
Page 15 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
available year (HEIRMAN and CLARYSSE, 2005). This growth measure has limitations as it 
assumes a linear growth process. Furthermore, a longer-term growth measure would be more 
desirable (LERNER, 1999), but unfortunately data that would enable this analysis are not 
available. 
 
     The population of BAN-backed companies is identified through the deal list of the four 
Flemish BANs. The sample of companies that received BA financing through another channel 
is based on two sources: (i) the interviews with the BAs who have invested through a BAN 
and were asked to identify all their investments, (ii) a database with the financing sources of 
221 Flemish high-tech start-ups (HEIRMAN and CLARYSSE, 2005). After removing 
overlaps between data sources and companies that we could not further identify, we retained 
44 BAN-backed companies and 66 BA-backed companies that found a BA through another 
channel. Further, companies that received BA financing before 1992 and after August 2003 
were also removed.  The final samples consist of 34 BAN-backed companies and 50 BA-
backed companies that received BA financing through another channel.  
 
     In order to assess the marginal impact of a government programme, we need a sample of 
similar companies that did not benefit from this programme (LERNER et al., 2005). Hence, 
we match the BAN-backed companies to non-BA-backed companies on age, industry and size 
(LERNER, 1999; PURI and ZARUTSKI, 2007). Age is measured in the year prior to BA 
participation or the year of BA participation if the BA participated at start-up.  Second, we 
match the BAN-backed companies on industry based on the NACE-BEL codes (comparable 
to 3-digit SIC codes).  Third, we match on size, proxied by total assets.   
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SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
 
     The 34 interviewed BAs3, representing 36 out of the 55 BAN-backed companies, have 
invested €11.7 million through a BAN or €324,489 per company.  Extrapolating this amount 
to all BAN-backed companies, we estimate that BAs invested €17.8 million through BANs, or 
€20.83 per Euro of government money spent.  Furthermore, the 34 BAs have invested an 
additional €22,8 million4 in companies found through another channel or €519,055 per 
company.  BAs’ attitudes, investment behaviour and demographic characteristics are 
consistent with those of BAs in other countries (e.g. MASON, 2006), further supporting the 
external validity of our study. 
 
     The 28 BAN-backed companies, whose entrepreneurs were interviewed, have following 
characteristics.  The BA participated within the first two years after incorporation in 15 out of 
the 28 companies. Each company has, on average, received €236,571 from BAN investors. If 
extrapolated, this would amount to €13.0 million invested through a BAN or €15.19 per Euro 
of government money spent on the BANs5. The Flemish BAN investors invested €2.6 million 
per year, which is twice the amount invested by the U.K. BAs under the DTI initiative in the 
early nineties, €1.4 million per year (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b).  
 
     The companies in the quantitative sample closely match the profile of the companies 
represented in the qualitative sample in terms of industry and age at BA participation. Further, 
the BAN-backed companies’ profiles fit well into the traditional view on market failure. 
Young and/or small high-growth oriented and/or high-tech companies are the most likely 
victims of a market failure, due to R&D externalities, informational opaqueness and low 
levels of collateral (e.g. BERGER and UDELL, 1998; DA RIN et al., 2006; CUMMING, 
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2007; MURRAY, 2007). 56% of the companies in the sample received BA financing under 
the age of two; 71% received it under the age of five. Furthermore, the majority of our sample 
(71%) comprises small enterprises with 10 or less employees. Finally, more than half of our 
sample is active in technological activities, ranging from the production of natural resources 
to ICT and R&D services, to high-tech manufacturing. Fourteen companies have failed since 
the BA investment. Taken together, the BAN-backed companies are in the target group of 
high-growth oriented companies with likely market failure problems (CUMMING, 2007).  
 
MARKET FAILURE: FINANCING AND INFORMATION PROBLEMS 
      
___________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
____________________________ 
 
     The qualitative and quantitative analyses suggest that financing and information problems 
exist in the informal risk capital market. More particularly, the pre-investment debt capacity 
of BAN-backed companies is significantly lower compared to non-BA-backed companies 
(Table 1, Panel A). As much as 96% of their assets are financed with debt, compared to 82% 
for the non-BA-backed sample (although the difference is not statistically significant). Their 
lower cash flows and profit ratios suggest that their financial risk is higher and therefore the 
probability of raising financing from traditional sources is lower. The qualitative interviews 
provide further evidence for the financing constraints. When asked why they opted for BA 
financing, 18 entrepreneurs stated that there were no other options. Conversely, merely 5 out 
of 28 entrepreneurs referred to expected BA involvement and value-added as a motive for 
looking for BA financing. Although 17 entrepreneurs stated that they had another investor in 
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prospect at the time of BA investment - either banks or family and friends - they always 
admitted that both options were less suitable compared to BA money. They were either 
reluctant to mix personal and business life or the stringent conditions that go along with bank 
financing were not optimal for the company. Quantitative and qualitative results hence 
support the existence of financing constraints for entrepreneurial companies: these companies 
could probably not have found (the total amount of) financing through other sources. 
 
     We further find support for information problems in the informal risk capital market. 
There are no differences between the financial risk of BAN-backed companies and companies 
that found BAs through another channel, neither pre-investment (Table 1, Panel A) nor post-
investment (not shown in the table). This indicates that the risk of companies turning to BANs 
for financing is not higher than that of other BA-backed companies. In other words, BANs do 
not systematically attract the most risky companies unable to find financing through other 
channels. The only difference between the BAN-backed companies and the companies that 
found BAs through another channel is that the former experienced information problems in 
locating a BA. 20 of the interviewed entrepreneurs stated they approached a BAN as this was 
the only known way for them to get in contact with BAs. Conversely, only 5 entrepreneurs 
were confident that they would have found BA financing if the BANs had not existed.  
 
     Likewise, the BAs stated that they would not have known the companies without the 
BANs in 82% of the deals, confirming information problems. If the BANs had not existed, the 
BAs would thus not have been able to invest €14.2 million. In other words, each Euro of 
government subsidies has generated €16.63 of BA money, which otherwise would not have 
been invested in these companies. As it is possible that the BAs would have invested in other 
companies, the €14.2 million invested through the BANs probably overestimates the marginal 
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impact of the BANs. However, 74% of the BAs stated that they still had funds left for 
additional investments. Taken together, qualitative and quantitative results consistently 
support the existence of information problems, both for BAs and entrepreneurs, and the 
positive role of BANs in reducing these problems. Our study provides strong support for the 
assumption that the informal risk capital market is plagued by information problems leading 
to financing constraints.  
 
MARKET FAILURE: VALUE CREATION 
 
     The next step is to investigate whether BAN-backed companies create value. If not, a 
failure to raise funds outside BANs is merely the outcome of efficient resource allocation. 
Funding should not be channelled to non-value-creating companies.  
 
     Our results do not confirm the value-creating argument in the short term. BAN-backed 
companies create significantly less value than similar non-BA-backed companies and even 
destroy value up to three years after BA investment (Table 1, Panel B): the mean ROA of 
BAN-backed companies is negative, while non-BA-backed companies have positive ROAs. 
However, the difference between the two samples becomes less significant over the years to 
disappear in year 4 as the ROA of BAN-backed companies improves. The robustness check 
confirms these results6. The results indicate a J-curve effect: BAN-backed companies do not 
invest in a cost-effective manner in the short term, but this could be due to large up-front 
investments resulting in delayed returns7. 
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     Further, negative ROAs, low value-added and an upward trend in both are also present in 
the sample of companies that are backed by BAs, found outside a BAN. This again indicates 
that there are few differences between the two groups of BA-backed companies. 
 
     In conclusion, although financing and information problems do plague entrepreneurial 
companies, we cannot label this as a market failure yet as the BA(N)-backed companies are 
value destroying in the short term. However, we do notice a J-curve trend in the measures of 
value creation, what might point to the fact that these companies need more time to deploy 
their capital in the most effective way (LERNER, 1999). The short-term analyses may 
therefore underestimate the long-term value creation potential. For now, we advise caution in 
using the market failure argument as grounds for defending government programmes in the 
informal risk capital market but also point to the long-term potential of these companies. A 
longer time period is needed to see whether the positive evolution continues. 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
     The ultimate goal of the Flemish government was to stimulate regional economic growth 
and development (VAN ROMPUY, 1999). Important indicators hereof are job creation, taxes 
and value adding (LERNER, 1999; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001).  
 
     The BAN-backed companies together added €45.2 million in value from the year of BA 
participation onwards, or, €73.2 million if extrapolated to all 55 BAN-backed companies. 
Each Euro of government subsidies spent on the Flemish BANs generated an estimated 
€85.39 in value added. The value added grows on average with €73.780 per year in BAN-
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backed companies, which is significantly more than in non-BA-backed companies. BAN-
backed companies hence perform better than comparable non-BA-backed companies. 
 
___________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
____________________________ 
 
     The BAN-backed companies in the sample paid €547,000 in taxes in a five-year period 
starting from the year of the BA participation. Extrapolated, all BAN-backed companies paid 
€884,852 in taxes. We hence estimate that each Euro of government money spent on the 
BANs generated a direct return of €1.03 in taxes. Following their J-curve type evolution, the 
BAN-backed companies initially pay significantly less taxes than the non-BA-backed 
companies, but this difference disappears after three years when the taxes paid by BAN-
backed companies increase dramatically (Table 2). It is further remarkable that they pay 
significantly less taxes in year 3 than companies that received BA financing through another 
channel. 
 
     Finally, we assess job creation using several measures. Employee growth is significantly 
higher in BAN-backed companies than in non-BA-backed companies and comparable to that 
in companies that received BA financing through another channel. If extrapolated, all BAN-
backed companies together employ 495 people, representing 102 net jobs created (187 jobs 
created minus 85 jobs destroyed) from the year of BA participation until the last available 
year. Each BAN-backed company has created 1.84 jobs on average over the observation 
period (corresponding to an average yearly growth of 0.52 FTE), representing a subsidy of 
€8,399 per job created. As there is a high probability that BAN-backed companies would not 
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have existed without the BANs due to financing constraints, the most positive view is to 
consider all current 495 jobs as being additional. The subsidy per job created or retained is 
then €1,731. This compares to an estimated subsidy per job of €1,515 under the DTI initiative 
in the U.K., €4,000 under the European business incubators initiative and € 3,100 under the 
Structural Fund initiative in Belgium (HARRISON AND MASON, 1996b; EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2002).  
 
     The Flemish government thus succeeds in stimulating economic development and growth 
through the subsidization of BANs. BAN-backed companies generally contribute as much as 
companies that found BA financing without a BAN and significantly more than non-BA-
backed companies in terms of value-added and job creation, although they do initially pay 
less taxes.  
 
INDIRECT EFFECTS 
 
     An exhaustive evaluation of a government initiative needs to go beyond its direct effects 
(HARRISON and MASON, 1996b; LERNER, 1999). In addition to matching entrepreneurs 
and investors, BANs may provide other benefits, such as raising the awareness and legitimacy 
of BA financing, coaching and educating investors and entrepreneurs (which for the latter also 
entails feedback from potential investors) and enabling entrepreneurs to raise further 
financing thanks to BA financing, both at the time of the initial investment and later 
(HARRISON and MASON, 1996a;b; LUMME et al., 1998). Although hard to quantify, we 
briefly discuss each of these impacts. 
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     Due to the anonymity preference of BAs and the fact that entrepreneurs often have 
incomplete knowledge of financing sources (VAN AUKEN, 2001; PAUL et al., 2003), 
raising the awareness of potential market participants is an important task of BANs. 
Interviewed entrepreneurs and BAs agree that BANs have conducted a considerable 
awareness campaign on the existence and merits of BA financing. Furthermore, both parties 
considered this task to be important. 
 
     Additionally, BANs can coach entrepreneurs on writing a business plan or presenting 
themselves to potential investors. If BAs are not the most appropriate funding source, BANs 
can refer entrepreneurs to other, more suitable investors. The feedback provided by the BAs 
themselves may also be important. Even if entrepreneurs do not find an investor, they might 
strengthen their opportunity based on feedback received from the BAs they talked to. 
Education and training is a related task. BANs often provide specialized courses to investors 
and entrepreneurs on issues as negotiation, taxation or valuation. Based on our interviews, we 
found that entrepreneurs praise the BANs for their education and coaching. Although BAs 
consider the BANs to perform rather well in educating entrepreneurs, they suggest more 
emphasis on educating BAs although they do not consider this to be a critical task.  
 
     A final indirect effect is the fact that BA funding might enable entrepreneurs to raise 
additional financing, both at the time of BA financing and thereafter (HARRISON and 
MASON, 1996b). Cumming (2007) interprets the ability of companies to raise follow-on 
funding even as an indirect indication of entrepreneurial success, especially if they have not 
come to full fruition. Ten BAN-backed companies raised on average €243,518 from BAs not 
connected to a BAN and €233,313 from other sources at the time of the BA investment. More 
particularly, four raised money from a bank, four from the government (subsidies), one from 
Page 24 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
3Fs, one from VCs and one from other companies. In comparison, companies benefiting from 
the DTI initiative raised €298,516 at the time of BA funding (HARRISON and MASON, 
1996b). While Flemish BAN-backed companies raised somewhat less than their UK 
colleagues, this confirms the satisfactory performance of the Flemish companies. 
 
     Further, 61% of the entrepreneurs state that the BA financing had a positive impact on 
follow-on financing. Fourteen companies were able to raise follow-on bank financing, two 
VC financing and four raised financing through other channels such as government subsidies. 
On average, they raised another €365,000 following BA financing. According to Harrison and 
Mason (1996b), one quarter of the companies should be able to attract at least 50% of the 
original amount as follow-on financing. The Flemish BAN-backed companies performed well 
as one quarter of the BAN-backed companies were able to raise 168% of the original amount. 
This yields further positive evidence of potential future value creation (CUMMING, 2007).  
These results suggest that the Flemish BANs, in addition to their direct effects, also generate 
important positive indirect effects. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
     Designing a successful programme that addresses failures in the risk capital market 
without crowding out the private sector is not easy. International evidence shows that 
countries as Israel, Australia and the US have implemented successful programmes 
supporting the VC market (CUMMING, 2007). The goal of the present study is to evaluate 
whether one type of government intervention in the informal risk capital market, namely the 
subsidization of BANs, is warranted. We first assessed whether the subsidies have reached 
their goals of reducing the financing problems of value-creating entrepreneurial companies 
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and, by doing so, stimulating economic development and growth. Second, we assessed 
whether this intervention was based on correct assumptions. Government intervention in the 
risk capital market is usually based on the perception of a market failure. Therefore, we 
evaluated whether there is a failure in the BA market, i.e. whether there are value-creating 
companies that face financing problems caused by information problems or R&D spillovers. 
We further assessed some indirect effects. 
 
     Based on quantitative and qualitative data, we find clear evidence of BANs reducing 
information and financing problems of entrepreneurial companies. BANs finance particularly 
young companies with high financial risk in high-tech industries. These companies are most 
prone to information asymmetries and financial constraints. Moreover, entrepreneurs and BAs 
state that they would not have known each other without BANs. The programme is additive: it 
increases the supply of funds to entrepreneurial companies, rather than crowding out the 
private sector. Further, these companies do contribute to economic development and growth. 
In this sense, the Flemish government programme is a success as its goals are reached. At this 
point in time it is hard to assess whether the supported companies create value in the long 
term. In the short term, they seem to destroy value, but there is an upward trend in value 
adding and profitability in the last years of the analysis, what might point to these companies 
just needing more time to deploy their resources in the most effective way. The fact that most 
companies are able to raise significant amounts of follow-on funding is a further indication of 
future potential. The Flemish BAN programme produced positive indirect effects and 
compares well to the UK’s DTI initiative, our only benchmark (HARRISON and MASON, 
1996b). In conclusion, the fact that this programme has successfully reached its goals, created 
many positive indirect effects and that the companies supported through this programme hold 
value-creating potential, lead us to conclude that public BAN support is justified. However, in 
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order to make this tentative conclusion more robust, a longer-term evaluation of BAN-backed 
companies’ value creation is indispensable.  
 
     Our study has several contributions. First, we contribute to the academic evaluation 
literature, as there is a scarcity of government programmes’ evaluations. We contribute 
methodologically by combining quantitative and qualitative data. Second, our study dispels 
the popular view that BANs attract the worst-quality deals. Companies that seek funding 
through BANs are not riskier, nor do they grow less or have lower returns post-investment 
compared to companies that seek funding from BAs through another channel. Finally, it 
confirms the BANs’ role in reducing information and financing problems in the informal risk 
capital market.  
 
     Our study has a number of limitations. First, we mainly focused on the subsidies’ direct 
effects. As the externalities of the subsidies are hard to quantify, the impact of the government 
subsidies might be underestimated. Second, some positive outcomes, such as total BA money 
invested due to the existence of a BAN, might be over-estimated. Third, one could argue that 
publicly funded BANs should be compared with non-publicly funded ones. As the ultimate 
goal of BAN subsidies is to reduce information and financing problems of entrepreneurial 
companies, we consider it more relevant to study the ultimate beneficiaries of the measure. 
Moreover, none of the Flemish BANs would have existed without the subsidies: they were 
instrumental in setting up and running the BANs. There were (and still are) no Belgian BANs 
operating without subsidies (EBAN, 2005a).  
 
     We propose some suggestions for further research. As most BAN investments are young, 
we were only able to assess their post-investment performance up to four years. In order to 
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assess the value creation of BAN-backed companies longer-term analyses are essential. 
Another interesting avenue for further research is to compare companies that had financing 
alternatives prior to BA investment with those without. In order to further understand the 
impact of direct BAN subsidies, it is interesting to compare this approach with other 
approaches used to stimulate BA investments, e.g. tax reliefs or co-investment schemes. 
Given the relatively young nature of the latter programmes, we leave this as an avenue for 
future research. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
Veroniek Collewaert is Aspirant of the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders (FWO-
Vlaanderen) and greatly acknowledges the financial support of the Fund. The authors would 
also like to thank the “Research Center Entrepreneurship and Innovation of the Flemish 
Community” for assistance in the data collection. 
 
NOTES 
 
1: This might be over-estimated as we could only exclude double counting for BAs that made 
BAN investments. 
2: There is no significant difference in BAN-backed and non-BA-backed companies’ leverage 
up to two years after BA participation, which supports this assumption. This does not hold for 
the BA-backed companies that did not resort to a BAN. Comparisons with the latter thus need 
to be cautiously interpreted. 
3: As for representativeness tests, age and assets of the different subsamples of BAN-backed 
companies are not significantly different from the population of 55 BAN-backed companies. 
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As we have no data on the 20 BAs who did not participate in the study, we don’t know 
whether the interviewed BAs are representative for the BAs who have invested through one of 
the BANs.   
4: These amounts are lower limits since not all BAs were willing to provide this information. 
5: This differs from the €20.83 mentioned before since there is no perfect overlap between the 
interviewed BAs’ investments and the interviewed companies. 
6: BAN-backed companies have significantly lower value-added ratios compared to non-BA-
backed companies until year 2, but the difference is not significant thereafter. 
7: We thank an anonymous referee for this comment. 
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Table 1: Test of the market failure argument 
 
 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
(1) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and non-BA-backed companies, we used Wilcoxon 
rank tests 
(2) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and the other BA-backed companies, we used Mann-
Whitney tests 
 
 
 
Table 2: Evaluation of the contribution to economic development 
 
 
 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
(1) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and non-BA-backed companies, we used Wilcoxon 
rank tests 
(2) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and the other BA-backed companies, we used Mann-
Whitney tests 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
(in 000 EUR) 
BAN-backed compared 
to: 
(1) Non-BA-backed 
companies 
(2) BA-backed through 
another channel 
 Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N 
PANEL A: Pre-investment comparisons 
Return on assets (ROA) % -33.22 46.55 21 1.05*** 24.72 24 -15.26** 85.25 21 
Pre-tax profit -214.81 569.63 21 -3.83* 164.78 24 -36.41 96.98 22 
Operational profit -181.10 567.15 21 8.13** 166.92 24 -25.09 103.59 22 
Cash flow -96.52 445.21 21 35.68** 175.69 22 -3.36 97.57 22 
Total debt/total assets (%) 0.96 0.60 21 0.82 0.34 24 0.81 0.56 22 
PANEL B: Analysis of post-investment value creation 
ROA – Year 0 -38.53 51.34 26 11.76*** 19.87 29 -23.23 39.21 26 
ROA – Year 2 -38.53 72.12 28 12.34*** 19.11 32 -32.71 69.85 45 
ROA – Year 3 -42.38 134.23 23 11.09** 21.73 26 -26.36 50.63 43 
ROA – Year 4  6.97 95.85 14 5.44 10.31 19 -27.32 72.15 40 
Variable  
(in 000 EUR) 
BAN-backed 
compared to: 
(1) Non-BA-backed 
companies 
(2) BA-backed through 
another channel 
 Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N 
Taxes 
Year 0 3.82 7.51 11 22.09** 65.51 22 20.00 31.89 12 
Year 2 0.63 5.80 8 21.28** 41.46 25 12.42 24.14 19 
Year 3 9.67 25.24 12 17.36 24.03 25 28.83** 49.35 18 
Average yearly growth 
Value-added 73.78 144.41 30 -3.55** 146.54 33 148.00 415.24 46 
Employees (FTE) 0.52 1.57 21 -0.18** 1.82 16 2.74 8.60 44 
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